Rebuilding Communities after Violent Conflict: Informal Justice Systems and Resource Access by Joireman, Sandra F.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science
2014
Rebuilding Communities after Violent Conflict:
Informal Justice Systems and Resource Access
Sandra F. Joireman
University of Richmond, sjoirema@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications
Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joireman, Sandra F. "Rebuilding Communities after Violent Conflict: Informal Justice Systems and Resource Access." Harvard Human
Rights Journal, 2014, 1-7.
   1  
Rebuilding  Communities  after  Violent  Conflict:  Informal  Justice  Systems  and  
Resource  Access  
  
Sandra  F.  Joireman1  
  
A   community   recovering   from   war   or   ethnic   conflict   has   to   find   ways   of  
reweaving   the   fabric  of   economic  and  social   life  with  new  patterns  of   interaction  and  
changed   demographics.2      In   post-­‐‑conflict   settings   customary   law   has   a   particular  
attraction   because   of   the   moral   authority   it   brings   to   the   establishment   of   order.    
Customary  law  is  familiar,  tied  to  the  identity  and  history  of  a  community,  and  operates  
independently  of  outside   resources.     Although   the   term  evokes   images  of   a  universal  
acceptance   and   ancient   origin,   customary   law   has   always   been   dynamic,   defined   by  
those   in  power,   and   subject   to  political   interests.3         Informal   justice   systems  based  on  
customary   law   play   two   roles   in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings   by   both   resolving   conflict   and  
building  working  social  networks.    Here  I  discuss  the  role  of  customary  justice  systems  
in   controlling   access   to   land,   affirming   its   use   as   a   system   of   dispute   resolution   for  
returnees,   while   noting   serious   concerns   regarding   the   changed   nature   of   leadership  
and  the  inability  of  customary  mechanisms  to  mediate  disputes  with  powerful  external  
actors.            
  
To   understand   both   the   power   and   potential   problems   of   customary   law,   it   is  
important   to  examine   the   intertwined  nature  of   customary   law,   customary   leadership  
and   resource   access.      Customary   law   is   pervasive   in   Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa;   however,   it  
also  plays  an  important  role  in  other  post-­‐‑conflict  settings  such  as  Afghanistan  and  the  
Western  Balkans.      In  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa,   customary   law,  codified  during   the  colonial  
era  and  incorporated  into  national  political  systems,  has  provided  rules  for  control  over  
resources,  whether  people,  land,  trees,  or  water.    While  customary  land  tenure  systems  
differ   by   region,   they   are   generally   characterized   by   a   vesting   of   land   rights   in   the  
community   with   a,   now   contested,   assumption   of   inalienability.4      In   Liberia,   for  
                                                                                                              
1  Sandra  Joireman  is  the  Weinstein  Chair  of  International  Studies  and  Professor  of  Political  Science  at  the  University  
of  Richmond.    She  is  a  political  scientist  with  a  focus  on  property  rights,  law,  and  development.  She  has  worked  
extensively  in  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa  and  more  recently  in  the  Western  Balkans.  
2  My  thanks  go  to  Paul  Joireman  and  Carol  Summers  for  their  comments  on  an  early  draft.    The  Earhart  Foundation  
generously  funded  the  research.    All  flaws  remain  my  own.  
3  See  generally  Martin  Chanock,  A  Peculiar  Sharpness:  An  Essay  on  Property  in  the  History  of  Customary  Law  in  Colonial  
Africa,  32  J.  AFR.  HIST.  65,  65–88  (1991);  SALLY  FALK  MOORE,  SOCIAL  FACTS  AND  FABRICATIONS:  "ʺCUSTOMARY"ʺ  LAW  ON  
KILIMANJARO,  1880–1980  (1986).    
4  Land  rights  can  be  held  by  the  ethnic  group  with  clearly  defined  boundaries,  while  specific  family  units  retain  
control  over  particular  plots  of  land  within  the  ethnic  group’s  territory;  this  is  a  common  manifestation  of  customary  
tenure  systems  in  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa  as  developed  during  the  colonial  era.    Martin  Chanock,  Paradigms,  Policies  and  
Property:  A  Review  of  the  Customary  Law  of  Land  Tenure,  in  LAW  IN  COLONIAL  AFRICA  61,  63–68  (Kristin  Mann  &  Richard  
Roberts  eds.,  1991).  
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example,  public  law  recognizes  customary  land  rights  in  the  ‘Hinterland’  as  belonging  
to  ethnic  groups,  whether  or  not  they  have  deeds.    These  rights  are  vested  collectively  in  
all   members   of   the   community,   protected   by   the   state,   and   were   at   one   point  
inalienable,   though  that   is  no   longer  the  case  and  rural   land  is  now  bought  and  sold.5    
Community  membership,  then,  is  sufficient  for  adult  males  to  claim  a  right  to  the  land  
of   the   community.6      Use   rights   to   specific   plots   of   land   are   allocated   by   traditional  
leaders.    People  who  are  not  members  of  the  possessing  ethnic  group  can  rent  land.                
  
Traditional   leaders  administer  and   interpret  customary   law  for   the  community.    
For   example,   customary   law   can   determine   the   distribution   of   land   to   migrants   for  
farming,   who   controls   the   fruit   grown   on   trees,   or   whether   divorced   or   widowed  
women  will  be  able  to  retain  usufruct  rights  to  land.7    Traditional  leaders  may  bear  the  
title  of  chief  or  they  may  be  the  recognized  leaders  of  a  lineage.    In  most  places,  leaders  
have  lived  in  the  community  for  a  long  time  and  have  memory,  not  just  of  community  
members,   but   also   of   land   they   have   farmed   and   conflicts   they   have   had   with  
neighbors.      Typically,   customary   leaders   are   engaged   in   dispute   resolution   for   the  
community   either   as   a   first   step   in   a   dispute   resolution   process   or   as   the   exclusive  
arbiters  when   it   comes   to   issues   of   access   to   community   resources.8      There   are   other  
sorts   of   dispute   resolution   processes   that   are   informal,   but   not   customary,   such   as  
mediations  carried  out  by  specialists  in  alternative  dispute  resolution.    Here,  the  focus  is  
on  customary,  informal  systems  of  dispute  resolution,  based  on  customary  law.        
  
When  an   area  becomes  unsafe  due   to  violence,  most   of   the   civilian  population  
will   leave   and  not   return  until   danger   abates.     Not   everyone   chooses   to   return  home  
after   being   displaced.      Indeed,   the   longer   populations   are   displaced,   the  more   likely  
people   are   to   re-­‐‑establish   homes   and   livelihoods   elsewhere.     When   an   area   becomes  
more   secure,   several   factors   impact   people’s   desire   to   return   to   their   place   of   origin:  
economic   opportunities,   household   characteristics,   and   the   length   of   their  
displacement.9    Because  customary  land  tenure  exists  predominantly  in  rural  areas,  it  is  
                                                                                                              
5  LIZ  ALDEN  WILY,  SUSTAINABLE  DEVELOPMENT  INSTITUTE  &  FERN,  ‘SO  WHO  OWNS  THE  FOREST,’  113–25  (2007),  
http://www.rightsandresources.org/wp-­‐‑content/uploads/2014/01/doc_102.pdf.  
6  Women  rarely  have  primary  rights  to  land  under  customary  systems.    Instead  they  have  usufruct  rights  that  they  
acquire  based  on  their  relationship  with  male  lineage  members.    See  Sandra  F.  Joireman,  The  Mystery  of  Capital  
Formation  in  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa:  Women,  Property  Rights  and  Customary  Law,  36  WORLD  DEV.  1233,  1238  (2008).  
7  See  generally  MARJA  J.  SPIERENBURG,  STRANGERS,  SPIRITS,  AND  LAND  REFORMS:  CONFLICTS  ABOUT  LAND  IN  DANDE,  
NORTHERN  ZIMBABWE  (2004).  See  e.g.,  Elin  Henrysson  &  Sandra  F.  Joireman,  On  the  Edge  of  the  Law:  Women'ʹs  Property  
Rights  and  Dispute  Resolution  in  Kisii,  Kenya,  43  L.  &  SOC’Y  REV.  39,  44–48  (2009).  
8  It  is  important  to  recognize  that  the  power  of  customary  leaders  is  often  contested  or  their  power  limited  by  
statutory  law.    There  is  a  rich  literature  on  the  definition  and  use  of  customary  law  as  well  as  the  contested  power  of  
customary  leaders  which  space  constraints  prevent  me  from  addressing  here.    
9  Deniz  Sert,  Property  Rights  in  Return  and  Resettlement  of  Internally  Displaced  Persons  (IDPs)  A  Quantitative  and  
Comparative  Case  Study  8–11  (2008)  (unpublished  Ph.D.  dissertation,  City  University  of  New  York).        
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worth  noting  that  some  studies  have  demonstrated  a  reluctance  of  people  to  return  to  
homes  and  property  in  rural  settings  after  they  have  experienced  life  in  cities  or  refugee  
camps.      For   those  moving   from   rural   areas   to  urban  places   of   refuge,   a   return   to   the  
difficulties   of   life   in   rural   communities   appears   unappealing.      This   holds   true   for  
settings  as  diverse  as  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa  and  Bosnia.10    Young  people,  in  particular,  are  
attracted  to  the  availability  of  entertainment,  education  and  job  opportunities  in  urban  
areas.  
  
Conflict   creates   a   ‘new   normal’   in   how   customary   systems   are   used   and  
administered.     Demand   for   customary   land   access  will   not   be   the   same   after   conflict  
because  of  the  different  composition  of  the  returning  population  as  well  as  changes  in  
economic  opportunities.      Indeed,  after  conflict   in  both  Uganda  and  Liberia   there  were  
reports  of  a  depopulation  of  the  countryside.11    If  there  are  fewer  people  returning  to  an  
area,   one   might   think   that   there   would   be   less   conflict   over   resource   access,   but  
evidence   proves   otherwise.      In   Liberia   and   Uganda,   as   well   as   other   post-­‐‑conflict  
contexts,   return   has   led   to   an   abundance   of   disputes   over   customary   land.12      These  
conflicts  were   the   result   of   changed   settlement  patterns,13   land   claims  by  outsiders   to  
the  community,14  and  confusion  regarding  legitimate  claims.15        
  
                                                                                                              
10  Johnathan  Bascom,  Reconstituting  Households  &  Reconstructing  Home  Areas:  The  Case  of  Returning  Eritreans,  in  IN  
SEARCH  OF  COOL  GROUND:  WAR,  FLIGHT  &  HOMECOMING  IN  NORTHEAST  AFRICA  66,  66–79  (Tim  Allen  ed.,  1996).  See  also  
Julius  Holt,  Looking  Beyond  the  Towns:  Facts  &  Conjectures  about  Rural  Returnees  in  the  Ogaden  &  ‘Somaliland,’  in  IN  
SEARCH  OF  COOL  GROUND:  WAR,  FLIGHT  &  HOMECOMING  IN  NORTHEAST  AFRICA  143,  143–52  (Tim  Allen,  ed.,  1996);  
Gearoid  Ó  Tuathail,  Localizing  geopolitics:  Disaggregating  violence  and  return  in  conflict  regions,  29  POL.  GEOGRAPHY  256,  
256–65  (2010).      
11  Interview  with  Antwi  Adarkwah,  Land  Tenure  Expert,  Liberian  Land  Commission,  in  Monrovia,  Liberia  (Oct.  7,  
2012).  See  also  UNITED  NATIONS  PEACEBUILDING  PROGRAMME  &  HUMAN  RIGHTS  FOCUS,  LAND  CONFLICT  MONITORING  AND  
MAPPING  TOOL  FOR  THE  ACHOLI  SUB-­‐‑REGION  24  (2013),  http://www.lcmt.org/pdf/final_report.pdf.    
12  NORWEGIAN  REFUGEE  COUNCIL,  CONFUSIONS  AND  PALAVA:  THE  LOGIC  OF  LAND  ENCROACHMENT  IN  LOFA  COUNTY,  
LIBERIA  5–7  (2010),  http://www.gltn.net/jdownloads/NRC_Publications/candp.pdf.  See  also  USAID,  LAND  MATTERS  IN  
NORTHERN  UGANDA:  ANYTHING  GROWS;  ANYTHING  GOES  POST–CONFLICT  “CONFLICTS”  LIE  IN  LAND  7–9  (2007),  
http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/USAID_Land_Tenure_Land_Matters_in_Northern_Uganda_Report.pdf.  
See  also  UNITED  NATIONS  PEACEBUILDING  PROGRAMME,  supra  note  10,  at  31–42;  Liberia:  Land-­‐‑rights  Tensions  Not  Abating,  
IRIN  NEWS  (May  17,  2010),  http://www.irinnews.org/report/89149/liberia-­‐‑land-­‐‑rights-­‐‑tensions-­‐‑not-­‐‑abating;  Uganda:  
Escalating  Land  Disputes  in  the  North,  IRIN  NEWS  (Feb.  17,  2011),  http://www.irinnews.org/report/91957/uganda-­‐‑
escalating-­‐‑land-­‐‑disputes-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑north.  See  also  Levis  Onegi,  Post-­‐‑conflict  Land  Insecurity  Threatens  Re-­‐‑displacement  in  
Northern  Uganda,  41  FORCED  MIGRATION  REV.  31,  31–32  (2012).  
13    See  generally  Sandra  F.  Joireman,  et  al.,  A  Different  Way  Home:  Resettlement  Patterns  in  Northern  Uganda,  31  POL.  
GEOGRAPHY  1,  1–8  (2012).  
14  DRC-­‐‑Rwanda,  Land  Rows  Complicate  Refugees'ʹ  Return,  IRIN  NEWS  (Jul.  2,  2010),  
http://www.irinnews.org/report/89708/drc-­‐‑rwanda-­‐‑land-­‐‑rows-­‐‑complicate-­‐‑refugees-­‐‑return;  UGANDA:  Returnees  
Caught  up  in  Land  Disputes,  IRIN  NEWS  (Oct.  1,  2008),  http://www.irinnews.org/report/80694/uganda-­‐‑returnees-­‐‑
caught-­‐‑up-­‐‑in-­‐‑land-­‐‑disputes.    
15  UNITED  NATIONS  PEACEBUILDING  PROGRAMME,  supra  note  10,  at  17;  see  generally  CHERRYL  WALKER,  LANDMARKED:  
LAND  CLAIMS  &  LAND  RESTITUTION  IN  SOUTH  AFRICA  (2008).    
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Given  the  challenges  facing  the  state  in  administering  post-­‐‑conflict  territories,  an  
overall  lack  of  state  strength,  and  the  moral  authority  of  customary  law,  the  burden  of  
resolving   land   conflicts   generally   falls   on   informal   justice   systems   and   customary  
dispute   resolution   strategies.16      Yet,   customary   systems   are   also   changed   by   conflict.    
There  are  two  important  alterations  that  are  noted  here  as  they  suggest  caution  in  the  
expectations  of  customary  dispute  resolution  systems;  1)  changes  in  traditional  leaders,  
and   2)   a   shift   in   external   pressures   on   customary   resource   allocation.      The   first   is   a  
limitation  on  the  effectiveness  of  informal  dispute  resolution  that  comes  from  within  a  
community,  while  the  second  originates    outside  the  community.  
  
New  traditional  leaders  
  
The   experience   of   violence   and   population   displacement   leads   to   changes   in  
traditional   leadership.      Older   leaders   die   during   the   period   of   displacement.      New  
leaders   with   different   memories   and   experiences   struggle   to   replace   them.      In   some  
cases  these  new  leaders  might  be  ex-­‐‑combatants  or  people  looking  to  control  territory,  
rather  than  those  we  would  typically  think  of  as  traditional  leaders.    Traditional  leaders  
can   also   take   advantage   of   the   ambiguity   that   exists   in   post-­‐‑conflict   rural   settings.    
Leaders   can  work   this   ambiguity   to   their   advantage,   selling   land   that   they  might  not  
have  full  authority  to  control  and  otherwise  using  their  ‘office’  to  engage  in  rent-­‐‑seeking  
behavior.     Pauline  Peters  appropriately  warns  of  an  excessively  positive  interpretation  
of  the  flexibility  of  customary  tenure  systems  as  this  very  feature  lends  those  systems  to  
manipulation.17  
  
One  of   the  problems   in   the  reconstruction  of  communities   in  Northern  Uganda  
has  been  that  the  traditional  leaders  were  displaced  for  so  long  that  there  was  no  longer  
sufficient   knowledge   of   land   claims.      “As   people   return   to   their   villages,   they   are  
confronted  with   the   realization   that   over   a   period   of   20   years,   clan   leaders,   heads   of  
households  and  the  elderly  who  would  have  knowledge  of   the  previous  set-­‐‑up   in   the  
villages   are   no   more…”18      Some   of   those   who   returned   to   their   homes   in   Northern  
Uganda   had   been   displaced   for   almost   two   decades.      Informal   conflict   resolution  
systems   are   less   helpful   if   the   adjudicators   have   limited   knowledge   of   tradition   and  
community  history.    In  Northern  Uganda,  it  took  years  after  the  population  returned  for  
                                                                                                              
16  See  generally  Stephen  C.  Lubkemann,  et  al.,  Unintended  Consequences:  Constraint  of  Customary  Justice  in  Post-­‐‑Conflict  
Liberia,  in  CUSTOMARY  JUSTICE  AND  THE  RULE  OF  LAW  IN  WAR–TORN  SOCIETIES  193,  193–237  (Deborah  Isser  ed.,  2011);  see  
also  DEBORAH  H.  ISSER,  ET  AL.,  RIFT  VALLEY  INSTITUTE  &  UNITED  STATES  INSTITUTE  OF  PEACE,  LOCAL  JUSTICE  IN  SOUTHERN  
SUDAN  5  (2010),  http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW66%20-­‐‑
%20Local%20Justice%20in%20Southern%20Sudan.pdf.  
17  Pauline  E.  Peters,  Challenges  in  Land  Tenure  and  Land  Reform  in  Africa:  Anthropological  Contributions,  37  WORLD  DEV.  
1317,  1319–20  (2009).  
18  Uganda:  Escalating  Land  Disputes,  supra  note  11.  
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the   customary   dispute   settlement   systems   to   start   adjudicating   land   disputes;   when  
they  did  begin  to  function,  customary  systems  have  been  effective  in  resolving  conflicts  
within  the  community.19      
  
The  nature  of   traditional   leadership  can  also  change.      In  Liberia,   individuals   in  
positions   of   traditional   leadership   prior   to   the   war   lost   their   status   after   moving   to  
refugee  camps  where  they  no  longer  controlled  the  same  social  and  economic  resources.    
Other  authority  structures,  such  as  NGOs  or  armed  groups,  took  their  place  in  terms  of  
social  control.20    After  a  conflict  ends  and  people  return  to  their  homes,  there  have  been  
instances   in  which   the  actions  of   traditional   leaders  were  so  egregious  and  counter   to  
the   welfare   of   the   community   that   other   institutions   have   developed   to   circumvent  
them.      For   example,   in   Liberia,   several   communities   have   established   locally   elected  
land   committees   with   parallel   structures   to   those   of   the   traditional   authorities   (who  
have  designated   government   positions)   so   that   they   can  undermine   the   ability   of   the  
traditional  leaders  to  give  away  land  for  purposes  of  logging  or  commercial  agricultural  
ventures.21    Alternatively,  people  who  have  no  real  claims  to  traditional  leadership  can  
set  themselves  up  as  such.    In  Cote  D’Ivoire,  after  violence  occurred,  youth  returning  to  
communities   established   their   own   ‘traditional   leaders’   and   refused   to   recognize   the  
people   who   had   previously   been   in   these   positions.22      Under   the   customary   system  
prior  to  the  war,  youth  would  rarely  have  played  such  a  role  in  community  leadership.          
  
Elinor   Ostrom   has   argued   that   successful   common   resource   regimes   exhibit  
similar  characteristics,  one  of  which  is  the  effective  monitoring  by  people  accountable  to  
the  community  users.23    When  customary  leadership  changes  significantly  after  conflict,  
or   when   those   who   put   themselves   in   the   place   of   customary   leaders   are   former  
combatants,  issues  of  accountability  are  called  into  question  and  opportunities  for  rent-­‐‑
seeking  increase.    In  such  settings,  informal  dispute  resolution,  specifically  pertaining  to  
resource   access,   is   unlikely   to   be   a   robust   system   for   defending   the   individual   or  
collective  property  rights  of  the  community.    This  threat  to  resources  comes  from  within  
the  reconstructed  community  itself.  
  
                                                                                                              
19  UNITED  NATIONS  PEACEBUILDING  PROGRAMME,  supra  note  10,  at  61.  
20  See  generally  NORWEGIAN  REFUGEE  COUNCIL,  supra  note  11.    
21  Interview  with  Alfred  Brownwell,  Lawyer,  Green  Advocates,  in  Monrovia,  Liberia  (Oct.  4,  2012).  
22  BARBARA  MCCALLIN,  ICTJ  &  BROOKINGS-­‐‑LSE  PROJECT  ON  INTERNAL  DISPLACEMENT,  RESTITUTION  AND  LEGAL  PLURALISM  
IN  CONTEXTS  OF  DISPLACEMENT  14  (2012),  http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-­‐‑Brookings-­‐‑Displacement-­‐‑Restitution-­‐‑
Legal-­‐‑Pluralism-­‐‑CaseStudy-­‐‑2012-­‐‑English_0.pdf.  See  also  Interview  with  Marzia  Montemurro,  Country  Analyst  for  
Côte  d'ʹIvoire,  Liberia,  Niger,  Nigeria,  and  Senegal,  Internal  Displacement  Monitoring  Centre,  in  Geneva,  Switzerland  
(Mar.  10,  2011).  
23  See  generally  ELINOR  OSTROM,  GOVERNING  THE  COMMONS:  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  INSTITUTIONS  FOR  COLLECTIVE  ACTION  
(1990).  
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New  claims  on  resources  
  
The  example  from  Liberia  above  in  which  customary  leaders  were  undermined  
after   they   gave   away   community   land   to   outside   commercial   interests   leads   to   the  
second   caution   regarding   informal   justice   systems   and   post-­‐‑conflict   resource   access.    
Informal   and   customary   justice   systems  are   significantly   challenged   in   their   ability   to  
address  resource  conflicts  with  outside  actors  such  as  large  business  enterprises  or  even  
the  state  itself.        
  
In   post-­‐‑conflict   settings,   there   is   a   demand   for   development   and   new  
opportunities   for   private   business   and   government   projects   to   kick-­‐‑start   local  
economies.    However,  the  immediate  post-­‐‑conflict  period  is  also  a  time  of  vulnerability  
in  terms  of  property  rights  as  customary  systems  may  not  yet  be  re-­‐‑established,  strong,  
or   able   to   defend   the   interests   of   their  members   from   resource   grabs   by   the   state   or  
outside   actors.24      Daniel   Fitzpatrick   and   others   have   emphasized   the   importance   of  
complex   customary   tenure   rules   in   post-­‐‑conflict   settings   as   a   source   of   protection   of  
land   rights.25      They   argue   that   community   land   allocation  mechanisms  may   have   an  
undesirable   complexity   when   viewed   by   outsiders,   but   that   complexity   serves   a  
purpose   in   that   it  enables   local  enforcement  mechanisms  without  relying  on  the  state.    
This   is  vital   in  post-­‐‑conflict   settings  where   the  state  may  be  weak,  unpredictable,  and  
simply  unable  to  enforce  property  rights  even  if  it  wanted  to  do  so.      
  
Given  the  prevalence  of  land  grabs  in  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa,  guarantees  of  resource  
security   from  complex   tenure   rules  are   salient  only   to   the  extent   that   the  government  
recognizes   those  customary  tenure  rules  as  valid  and  enforces  customary  control  over  
land.      If   the   government   itself   is   facilitating   resource   expropriation,   then   customary  
rules   are   not   likely   to   have   much   effect.26      Even   when   the   government   is   not   the  
problem,   customary  dispute   resolution   systems  are   challenged  by   the   competition   for  
resources  in  post-­‐‑conflict  settings  as  they  will  not  be  viewed  by  all  interested  parties  as  
the  correct   forum  for  resource  adjudication.      Jon  Unruh  notes   that  “….the  presence  of  
local   farmers,   dislocatees,   commercial   interests,   and   demobilized   combatants   from  
different  sides  in  the  conflict,  all  located  in  the  same  areas,  will  mean  that  land  disputes  
                                                                                                              
24  See  generally  USAID,  supra  note  11.  
25  See  generally  DANIEL  FITZPATRICK,  et  al.,  PROPERTY  AND  SOCIAL  RESILIENCE  IN  TIMES  OF  CONFLICT:  LAND,  CUSTOM  AND  
LAW  IN  EAST  TIMOR  (2012).  
26  LORENZO  COTULA,  et  al.,  FAO,  FAO  &  IFAD,  LAND  GRAB  OR  DEVELOPMENT  OPPORTUNITY?  AGRICULTURAL  INVESTMENT  
AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAND  DEALS  IN  AFRICA  91–92,  (2009),  http://www.ifad.org/pub/land/land_grab.pdf.  
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involving   these   players   will   unlikely   be   able   to   locate   a   commonly   respected   and  
legitimate  authority.”27      
  
Elinor  Ostrom  has  emphasized  the  importance  of  ensuring  that  the  members  of  a  
group  can  protect  their  resources  from  outsiders  in  communal  resource  regimes.28    This  
is  precisely  the  problematic  aspect  of  customary  law  and  dispute  resolution  systems  in  
post-­‐‑conflict  settings  -­‐‑  they  are  unable  to  assure  the  excludability  of  other  claims.    That  
must  be  done  elsewhere  by  courts  empowered  to  adjudicate  the  actions  of  the  state  and  
commercial   interests   that  may  not  be   local.     Without   the  ability   to   effectively   exclude  
claims  from  outsiders  during  post-­‐‑conflict  periods,  informal  dispute  resolution  systems  





Customary   law,  customary   leadership,  and  control  over  natural   resources  have  
been   tied   together   in  Sub-­‐‑Saharan  Africa,   creating  a   context   in  which   informal   justice  
systems   have   been   a   traditional   and,   at   times,   effective   forum   for   the   resolution   of  
disputes  over  resources.     However,   in  post-­‐‑conflict   settings,   significant  changes   in   the  
nature  of  traditional  leaders  and  external  claims  on  resources  create  a  ‘new  normal’  in  
which   informal  dispute  settlements  may   leave  a  community  vulnerable   to   land  grabs.    
This  is  not  to  say  that  dispute  resolution  systems  embedded  in  customary  law  are  not  
useful.    The  emphasis  on  social  harmony  and  reconciliation  that  characterizes  informal  
dispute   resolution   systems   may   be   extremely   effective   in   addressing   some   family  
disputes,  adjudicating  minor  crimes  and  injuries,  and  reincorporating  ex-­‐‑combatants  to  
the  community.    Customary  dispute  resolution  processes  are  sufficient  to  address  small  
conflicts  within  a  community,  but  when  land  claims  are  made  by  powerful  actors  who  
are   community   leaders   or   outsiders,   informal   dispute   settlement   processes   will   be  
insufficient  to  protect  property  rights.      
  
  
                                                                                                              
27    Jon  D.  Unruh,  Toward  Sustainable  Livelihoods  After  War;  Reconstituting  Rural  Land  Tenure  Systems,  32  NAT.  RESOURCES  
F.  103,  108  (2008).  
28  See  generally  Elinor  Ostrom,  Design  Principles  of  Robust  Property-­‐‑Rights  Institutions:  What  Have  We  Learned?,  in  
PROPERTY  RIGHTS  AND  LAND  POLICIES  25,  25–51  (K.  Gregory  Ingram  &  Yu-­‐‑Hong,  eds.,  2009).  
